

Message Text

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61

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 IO-13 ADP-00 AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NASA-04 NEA-10 NSAE-00

NSC-10 OIC-04 PA-03 PRS-01 RSC-01 SCI-06 SS-15

MBFR-03 USIA-15 SAJ-01 RSR-01 /192 W

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 935

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION USUN NY

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USMISSION IAEA VIENNA UNN

AEC GERMANTOWN UNN

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DISTO

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM-US, SW

SUBJ: CCD: 618TH PLENARY MEETING, AUGUST 2, 1973

FOLWG CABLE POUCHED TO

ADDIS ABABA, ANKARA, ATHENS, BELGRADE, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS,
BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, BUENOS AIRES, THE HAGUE, HELSINKI, ISLAMABAD,
LAGOS, MEXICO, NEW DELHI, OSLO, OTTAWA, PARIS, PRAGUE, RABAT
RANGOON, RIO DE JANEIRO, ROME, SOFIA, WARSAW

1. SUMMARY: MARTIN (US) DISCUSSED SWEDISH CONCEPT

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OF "AMPLIFIED VERIFICATION" IN RELATION TO COMPREHENSIVE

PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW). HE QUESTIONED APPLICABILITY OF SWEDISH CONCEPT, (WHICH BASED ON PROBABILITY THEORY) TO PROBLEM OF CW VERIFICATION, POINTING OUT THAT THERE IS NO REALISTIC BASIS FOR ASSIGNING PROBABILITIES TO VARIOUS MEANS OF DETECTION OF A VIOLATION. HE ALSO NOTED PROBABILITIES OF DETECTION COULD BE CONTROLLED BY VIOLATOR. MARTIN QUESTIONED POSSIBLE USE OF WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH AMPLIFIED VERIFICATION, NOTING THAT ONUS FOR FAILURE TREATY REGIME LIKELY FALL ON COUNTRY SUSPECTING VIOLATION SINCE SYSTEM DEFICIENCIES WOULD PROVIDE LITTLE EVIDENCE OF VIOLATION. MYRDAL (SWEDEN), IN BRIEF COMMENT, SAID RISKS INHERENT IN LACK OF TREATY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS WELL AS THOSE RISKS WE HAD POINTED OUT IN THEIR VERIFICATION SYSTEM FOR TREATY. END SUMMARY

2. MARTIN DISCUSSED SWEDISH WORKING PAPER ON AMPLIFIED VERIFICATION IN RELATION TO COMPREHENSIVE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW). WORKING PAPER, WHICH SUBMITTED IN SPRING SESSION, SUGGESTS THAT VERIFICATION POSSIBILITIES, FOLLOWING PROBABILITY THEORY, CAN BE AMPLIFIED BY MONITORING A NUMBER OF PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO BUILDING OR MAINTAINING CW CAPABILITY. MARTIN QUESTIONED APPLICABILITY OF SWEDISH CONCEPT TO PROBLEMS OF CW VERIFICATION. HE POINTED OUT THAT COMMITTEE STILL ENGAGED IN DISCUSSION AND FORMULATION VERIFICATION METHODS AND NO FIRM STATISTICAL BASIS EXISTS FOR ASSIGNING PROBABILITIES TO METHODS OF MONITORING A CW AGREEMENT.

3. HE ALSO CHALLENGED IDEA THAT VIOLATOR WOULD FIND IT ESSENTIAL TO ENGAGE IN NUMBER OF PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES AT SAME TIME. HE NOTED AS EXAMPLE THAT IF AGENT STOCKPILES RETAINED, THIS SINGLE ACTIVITY WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO BE DETECTED BY SYSTEM, AND COULD GIVE VIOLATOR SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ADVANTAGE. MARTIN ALSO STATED THAT PROBABILITIES OF DETECTION OF ANY PARTICULAR ACTIVITY COULD BE CONTROLLED BY PARTY WISHING VIOLATE TREATY AND IT THUS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE ASSIGN PROBABILITIES OF DETECTION. HE ALSO EXPRESSED DOUBTS ON USE OF WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE IN REGARD TO SUSPECTED VIOLATION OF TREATY BASED ON AMPLIFIED VERIFICATION, NOTING THAT DEFICIENCIES OF SYSTEM LIKELY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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RESULT IN SKIMPY EVIDENCE OF VIOLATION AND ONUS FOR FAILURE OF TREATY REGIME COULD THEN FALL ON COUNTRY SUSPECTING VIOLATION RATHER THAN ON ACTUAL VIOLATOR.

4. AMB MYRDAL, IN BRIEF COMMENT, SAID SWEDES WOULD STUDY MARTIN STATEMENT IN DETAIL AND RETURN TO SUBJECT. SHE ALSO STATED RISKS INHERENT IN LACK OF CW TREATY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS WELL AS RISKS WE HAD POINTED OUT IN SUGGESTED

SWEDISH VERIFICATION SYSTEM. SHE WAS SURPRISED THAT US
OFTEN SEEMED TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN RISKS OF HAVING
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, THAN IN BENEFITS TO BE GAINED
FROM THEM. SHE WAS INTERESTED IN OBLITERATION OF
"UNFAIR ADVANTAGES" WHICH EXIST IN PRESENT PRE-TREATY
SITUATION.

5. NEXT PLENARY SESSION TUESDAY, AUGUST 7.

DECONTROL AFTER AUGUST 2, 1974.

BASSIN

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30 JUN 2005

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